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PCP for PPAD and the Inapproximability of Nash
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Abstract
We conjecture that PPAD has a PCP-like complete problem, seeking a near equilibrium in which
all but very few players have very little incentive to deviate. We show that, if one assumes that
this problem requires exponential time, several open problems in this area are settled. The
most important implication, proved via a “birthday repetition” reduction, is that the nO(log n)
approximation scheme of Lipton et al. [23] for the Nash equilibrium of two-player games is
essentially optimum. Two other open problems in the area are resolved once one assumes
this conjecture, establishing that certain approximate equilibria are PPAD-complete: Finding a
relative approximation of two-player Nash equilibria (without the well-supported restriction of
[14]), and an approximate competitive equilibrium with equal incomes [10] with small clearing
error and near-optimal Gini coefficient.
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1 Introduction
It is known that finding an ε-approximate Nash equilibrium in a two-person game:
1. is PPAD-complete if ε is inversely polynomial [12];
2. but can be solved in quasipolynomial time for any fixed ε > 0 [23]; and
3. the smallest known polynomially attainable approximation ratio is still over 310 [28].
These three facts articulate rather dramatically the mystery, by now almost a decade old, of the
problem’s approximability.
Can the inversely polynomial inapproximability bound of [12] be improved to constant? Un-
likely, because by [23] this would imply a quasipolynomial algorithm for the iconic problem in
PPAD:
Definition 1. End of the Line: ([15]) Let S and P be two circuits with (at most) O˜(n) gates
each (computing the predecessor and successor correspondences) with n input bits and n output
bits each, such that P (0n) = 0n 6= S (0n), find an input x ∈ {0, 1}n such that P (S (x)) 6= x or
S (P (x)) 6= x 6= 0n.
Conventional wisdom, supported by black-box lower bounds [21, 5], is that this problem requires
exponential time to solve. In direct analogy with the exponential time hypothesis [22], we state the
following:
Conjecture 1. End of the Line requires 2Ω˜(n) time.
It was recently shown that this conjecture implies an identical lower bound for the Gcircuit
problem [12, 15]: Recall that a standard arithmetic circuit has inputs, outputs, and gates that define
arithmetic operations on its lines. In a generalized circuit there are no outputs, and the dependencies
between values become cyclical, thereby inducing a constraint satisfaction problem: the variables
correspond to the values on the lines, and each gate induces a constraint on the incoming and
outgoing lines. The ε-Gcircuit is defined to be the problem of finding values on the lines that
ε-approximately satisfy all the constraints induced by the arithmetic gates. It was recently shown
[26] that ε-Gcircuit is PPAD-complete for some small constant ε, via O˜(n) reductions. Therefore,
Conjecture 1 implies that, for some small ε > 0, roughly exponential time is required to find a
solution to this problem. There are several known ways to further reduce the ε-Gcircuit problem
to the two-player Nash equilibrium problem; however, all of these reductions fail to preserve the
quality of approximation, and, as we pointed out above, it is likely that no approximation-preserving
reductions are possible, as this would imply a quasipolynomial-time algorithm for End of the Line
through the algorithm in [23], contradicting Conjecture 1.
In this paper, we identify a plausible new conjecture, a strengthening of Conjecture 1 in a
natural and novel direction, which implies that the quasipolynomial approximation algorithm of [23]
is optimum. In particular, we define the (ε, δ)-Gcircuit to be the problem of finding values for the
variables (lines) that ε-approximately satisfy a fraction of at least (1− δ) of the constraints (gates).
Conjecture 2. There exist constants ε, δ > 0 such that there is a quasilinear reduction from
End of the Line to the problem (ε, δ)-Gcircuit. Therefore, also assuming Conjecture 1, (ε, δ)-
Gcircuit requires 2Ω˜(n) time.
As we have mentioned, this latter statement, albeit with δ = 0, is known to follow from only
Conjecture 1, for some ε > 0 [26].
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The Connection to PCP
The (ε, δ)-Gcircuit problem is a constraint satisfaction problem: each line/mixed strategy is a
real variable, and each gate/player defines a constraint. Since we are considering ε-approximate
satisfaction of the constraints, each variable need be represented using only a constant (depending
on ε) number of bits. Therefore, a satisfying assignment (truncations of a Nash equilibrium)
can be distinguished from an unsatisfying one (one violating the (ε− δ)-relaxation) by querying a
constant (proportional to 1/δ) number of bits of the input, determined at random (but of course not
uniformly so). This suggests that Conjecture 2 can be interpreted as a probabilistically checkable
proof formulation of Gcircuit: informally, it states that “PPAD has a PCP” (that is, a complete
problem whose witnesses can be verified by examining, at random, a finite number of bits).
The main result of this paper, explained next, reveals another similarity between the PCP
formulation of NP and the (ε, δ)-Gcircuit problem: The intractability of the latter problem
implies, among several other inapproximability theorems, the strongest possible inapproximability
result for the 2-player Nash equilibrium problem, arguably the central open question in the area.
The Main Result
We denote by ε-2Nash the problem of finding an ε-Nash equilibrium in a bimatrix game. Our
main result is the following:
Theorem 1. There is an ε > 0 such that, assuming Conjecture 2, solving ε-2Nash for two-player
games with n strategies requires nΩ˜(logn) time.
Our proof, given in Section 3, employs the technique of “birthday repetition,” pioneered by
[1] and used in different contexts by [8], and in particular by [9] to show intractability of a Nash
equilibrium-related problem. Starting from a polymatrix game with two strategies per player and
in which the player interactions form a cubic bipartite graph with n nodes on each side, the players
on both sides are broken into blocks of size
√
n. The game is simulated by a two-player game,
in which each player simulates the nodes in one of the sides of the bipartite graph by choosing a
block and a strategy for each node in it; that is, the total number of actions of each of the two
players is about 2
√
n, and such is the complexity of the reduction (this is necessary if one wishes
to rule out better than quasipolynomial algorithms). The interactions between blocks, plus certain
particular side games played by the two players, ensure a faithful enough simulation of the original
multimatrix game.
Remark: It is not hard to see that a quasipolynomial lower bound follows from a weaker assump-
tion than Conjecture 2, namely that the (ε, δ)-Gcircuit problem requires 2Ω˜(n
α) time, for some
α > 12 .
In addition to Theorem 1, we prove two other complexity consequences of Conjecture 2, solving
certain open problems in the area: An improved inapproximability result for the problem of relative
(multiplicative) approximation of the Nash equilibrium first established by Dskalakis [14], and an
inapproximability result for the problem of finding a competitive equilibrium with equal incomes
and indivisible goods [10, 25] when one seeks to minimize the Gini index of the income distribution.
2 The (ε, δ)-Gcircuit and Weak Approximate Nash
Generalized circuits are similar to the standard algebraic circuits, the main difference being that
generalized circuits contain cycles, which allow them to verify fixed points of continuous functions.
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We restrict the class of generalized circuits to include only a particular list of gates described below.
Formally,
Definition 2. [Generalized circuits, [12]] A generalized circuit S is a pair (V,T ), where V is a set
of nodes and T is a collection of gates. Every gate T ∈ T is a 5-tuple T = G (ζ | v1, v2 | v), in which
G ∈ {Gζ , G×ζ , G=, G+, G−, G<, G∨, G∧, G¬} is the type of the gate; ζ ∈ R ∪ {nil} is a (optional)
real parameter; v1, v2 ∈ V ∪ {nil} are the first and second input nodes of the gate (one or both of
them may be missing); and v ∈ V is the output node; no two distinct gates have the same output.
Alternatively, we can think of each gate as a constraint on the values on the incoming and out-
going wires. We are interested in the following constraint satisfaction problem: given a generalized
circuit, find an assignment to all the wires that simultaneously satisfies all the gates. When every
gate computes a continuous function of the incoming wires, a solution must exist by Brouwer’s
fixed point theorem.
In particular, we are interested in the approximate version of this CSP, where we must approx-
imately satisfy most of the constraints.
Definition 3. Given a generalized circuit S = (V,T ), we say that an assignment x : V → [0, 1]
(ε, δ)-approximately satisfies S if for all but a δ-fraction of the gates, x satisfies the corresponding
constraints:
Gate Constraint
Gζ (α || a) x [a] = α± ε
G×ζ (α | a | b) x [b] = α · x [a]± ε
G= (| a | b) x [b] = x [a]± ε
G+ (| a, b | c) x [c] = min (x [a] + x [b] , 1) ± ε
G− (| a, b | c) x [c] = max (x [a]− x [b] , 0) ± ε
G< (| a, b | c) x [c] =
{
1± ε x [a] < x [b]− ε
0± ε x [a] > x [b] + ε
G∨ (| a, b | c) x [c] =
{
1± ε x [a] = 1± ε or x [b] = 1± ε
0± ε x [a] = 0± ε and x [b] = 0± ε
G∧ (| a, b | c) x [c] =
{
1± ε x [a] = 1± ε and x [b] = 1± ε
0± ε x [a] = 0± ε or x [b] = 0± ε
G¬ (| a | b) x [b] =
{
1± ε x [a] = 0± ε
0± ε x [a] = 1± ε
Given a generalized circuit S = (V,T ), (ε, δ)-Gcircuit is the problem of finding an assignment
that (ε, δ)-approximately satisfies it.
Definition 4. In an (ε, δ)-weak approximate Nash equilibrium at most a δ-fraction of the players
can gain more than ε by deviating.
Theorem 2. Conjecture 2 is equivalent to the following statement: There exist constants ε′, δ′ > 0,
such that finding an (ε′, δ′)-weak approximate Nash equilibrium in a polymatrix graphical game with
degree 3 and 2 actions per player requires 2Ω˜(n) time.
Proof. The reduction from (ε, δ)-Gcircuit to (ε′, δ′)-weak approximate Nash equilibrium follows
analogously to the reduction in [26] from ε-Gcircuit to ε′-approximate Nash equilibrium.
3
The first step is to reduce (ε, δ)-Gcircuit to
(
Θ(ε2),Θ(ε · δ))-Gcircuit with fan-out 2. The
naive way to do this is to replace larger fan-outs with a binary tree ofG= gates. Daskalakis et al. [15]
successfully use this method for exponentially small ε, but for constant ε the iterative application
of G= gates accumulates too much noise (Θ(ε · log n)). Instead, we follow [26] and focus on logical
gates whose noise does not accumulate. Given an output of a logical gate (G<, G∨, G∧, G¬), we
can introduce a binary tree (with even depth) of G¬ gates that copy the original output instead
of having a single gate with a large fan-out. When we begin with an output of an arithmetic gate
(Gζ , G×ζ , G=, G+, G−), we first use Θ(1/ε) gates of types G= and G< to parse it into an ε-precision
unary representation. Then, we copy each bit in the unary representation using a tree of G¬ gates.
Finally, we (approximately) recover the original value from each copy of the unary representation
using Θ(1/ε) gates of types G×ζ and G+. Notice that the number of new gates introduced for
each gate at the leaves of the binary tree is Θ(1/ε). Therefore, if the solution to the new (fan-out
2) instance violates an O(δ · ε)-fraction of the gate-constraints, then it induces a solution to the
original (arbitrary fan-out) instance that violates at most a δ-fraction of the constraints. (See the
full version of [26] for more details.)
We now reduce (ε, δ)-Gcircuit with fan-out 2 to (ε′, δ′)-weak approximate Nash equilibrium.
Daskalakis et al. construct, for each gate in the generalized circuit, a game gadget with a few players
whose mixed strategies at approximate equilibrium simulate the computation carried by the gate. In
other words, every approximate equilibrium of the gate gadget induces an approximately satisfying
assignment to the corresponding input and output lines in the generalized circuit. See Lemma 1
for an example of such a gadget. The gadgets are concatenated by identifying the “output player”
of one gadget with the “input player(s)” of the next gadget(s) in the generalized circuit. Since each
gadget is composed of only a constant number of players, if all but a δ′-fraction of the players play
approximately at equilibrium, all but a δ = Θ(δ′)-fraction of the gates are violated by the induced
assignment to the generalized circuit.
The above construction suffices to show hardness for an (εˆ, δ′)-weak well-supported Nash equi-
librium, i.e. one for where all but a δ′-fraction of the players, every action in the support is
εˆ-approximately best response. Finally, for constant degree graphical games, it is not hard to
derive an (εˆ, δ′)-weak well-supported Nash equilibrium from any (ε′, δ′)-weak approximate Nash
equilibrium for ε′ = Θ(εˆ2) [26, Lemma 4].
In the other direction, from (ε′, δ′)-weak approximate Nash equilibrium to (ε, δ)-Gcircuit, it
suffices to construct a generalized circuit that computes an ε′-approximate best response of each
player (except a δ′-fraction). Notice that in a graphical game with a constant number of actions per
player, given a profile of mixed strategies, one only needs a constant number of arithmetic gates to
compute a best response of any player. In particular, to compute an ε-approximate best response
it suffices to use gates of finite precision ε′ = Θ(ε). Finally, since the number of gates per player is
constant, if at most a δ-fraction of the gates are ε-unsatisfied, they can appear in the best-response
computation for at most a δ′ = Θ(δ)-fraction of the players.
Lemma 1. (G×ζ gadget, [15])
Let v1,v2, and w be players in a graphical game, and suppose that the payoffs of v2 and w are
as follows.
Payoff for v2:
w plays 0 w plays 1
v2 plays 0 0 1
v2 plays 1 1 0
Payoffs for w:
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game with v1:
v1 plays 0 v1plays 1
w plays 0 0 ζ
w plays 1 0 0
game with v2:
v2 plays 0 v2plays 1
w plays 0 0 0
w plays 1 0 1
Then, in every ε-NE p [v2] = min (ζp [v1] , 1)± ε, where p [u] denotes the probability that u assigns
to strategy 1.
Proof. (Sketch) If p [v2] > ζp [v1] + ε, then in every ε-NE p [w] = 1, which contradicts p [v2] > ε.
Similarly, if p [v2] < min (ζp [v1] , 1)− ε, then p [w] = 0, which yields a contradiction when p [v2] <
1− ε.
3 Proof of Theorem 1
3.1 Overview
The proof is a reduction from weak approximation of Nash equilibrium in a polymatrix game (recall
Theorem 2) to the two-player problem. The two players simultaneously play three games: the main
game, which is the heart of the reduction; and two games based on a construction due to Althofer
[2], which impose structural properties of any approximate Nash equilibrium (interestingly, the
oblivious lower bound of [16] uses the same game). The final payoff of a player is the sum of payoffs
in all three games. For convenience of notation, the payoffs in each game will be in [0, 1]; in order
to normalize the payoffs in the final game to [0, 1] one should multiply by 1/3 the payoffs in all
three games.
Main game
We let each of the two players “control” the vertices on one side of the bipartite graphical game
(we henceforth use players only for the players in the bimatrix game, and refer to the players in
the graphical polymatrix game as vertices). For ease of notation, we assume wlog that each player
controls an equal number of vertices, n.
We partition the vertices of each player into n/k disjoint subsets of size at most 2k = 2
√
n, such
that every two subsets share at most 18 edges. By Lemma 6, we can efficiently find such a partition.
Let
(
S1, . . . , Sn/k
)
and
(
T1, . . . , Tn/k
)
denote the partitions of the respective players. Each action of
the players corresponds to a choice of a subset (out of n/k subsets in the partition), and a choice of
an action for each vertex in the subset (out of at most 22k vectors of actions). Together, the main
game has
(
n
k · 22k
)× (nk · 22k) action profiles. When players choose actions (Si, ~αSi) and (Tj , ~βTj),
the payoff of the row player is the sum of the payoffs over all shared edges of Si and Tj , when they
play the respective strategies from ~αSi and
~βTj (here we use the polymatrix structure of the payoffs
in the graphical game; the payoffs are defined over edges and therefore payoffs of a certain vertex
can be defined even though not necessarily all its neighbours are playing). Finally, we normalize by
λ/18, where λ = Θ(δ2) is a small constant that satisfies λ > ε′. Similarly the payoff of the second
player is derived from the payoffs of the vertices in Tj.
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Althofer’s games
Altofer’s game [2] is an asymmetric hide-and-seek win-lose game over l locations. The hider chooses
a location i ∈ [l], the seeker chooses a subset B ⊂ [l] of of size |B| = l/2. The hider wins if i /∈ B,
the seeker wins if i ∈ B. Namely, the payoff function is given by
u1(i, B) = 1− u2(i, B) =
{
1 if i /∈ B
0 if i ∈ B.
In Althofer’s game each player can guarantee 12 by uniform play, therefore the value of the game is
1
2 . Althofer’s game enjoys the following strong property: in every ε-approximate Nash equilibrium,
the hider must play a mixed strategy that is O(ε)-close to the uniform distribution in total variation
distance; see [16].
In our game each player plays two (unrelated) Althofer’s games, one game as a hider, and one
as a seeker. When player 1 is a hider, the locations are the sets S1, . . . , Sn/k (i.e., l = n/k). The
action from the main game (Si, ~αSi) determines the location, where for the purposes of Althofer’s
game we ignore ~αSi . When player 1 is a seeker, the locations are the sets T1, . . . , Tn/k, and player
1 chooses an action to play in this game, independent of (Si, ~αSi). The total number of actions
for player 1 is
(
n
k · 22k
) · ( n/k
n/(2k)
)
= 2O˜(
√
n). Similarly, for player 2, who is playing as a hider over
T1, . . . , Tn/k, and as a seeker over S1, . . . , Sn/k.
3.2 Structure of an equilibrium
For a mixed action x of player 1 we denote by x(Si) the total probability that the player chooses
to control the vertices Si; i.e.,
x(Si) =
∑
~α∈2[k],B⊂{T1,...,Tn/k},|B|= n2k
x(((Si, ~α), B)).
Lemma 2. If (x, y) is an ε′-Nash equilibrium, then
∑
i∈[n/k]
∣∣x (Si)− kn ∣∣ = O (λ).
In the proof we use the following Lemma from [16]:
Lemma 3 ([16]). Let {ai}i∈[l] be real numbers satisfying the following properties for some θ > 0:
(1) a1 ≥ a2 ≥ ... ≥ al; (2)
∑
i∈[l] ai = 0; and (3)
∑
i∈[l/2] ai ≤ θ. Then
∑
i∈[l] |ai| ≤ 4θ.
Proof of Lemma 2. In order apply Lemma 3, we denote ai = x(Si) − kn and we assume wlog that
x(S1) ≥ x(S2) ≥ ... ≥ x(Sn/k). Then the first two conditions hold. Regarding the third condition,
we argue that
∑
i∈[l/2] x(Si) ≤ 3λ this will complete the proof.
Player 1 can guarantee a payoff of 1/2 in the sum of Althofer’s games as a hider and the
main game, by playing uniformly and choosing an arbitrary actions for the controlled vertices (for
instance, ~αSi = ~0). Assume by contradiction that
∑
i∈[l/2] x(Si) > 3λ. Since Player 2 is ε
′-best
replying, his payoff in the Althofer game (as a seeker) is at least 12 + 3λ − ε′ (because he can get
1/2 + 3λ by choosing the set [l/2]). Therefore, Player 1’s payoff in the Althofer game (as a hider)
is at most 12 − 3λ + ε′. If we add to it his payoffs in the main game, then his payoff is at most
1
2 − 2λ+ ε′. Therefore, player 1 can increase his payoff by 2λ− ε′ > ε′ by deviating to the uniform
distribution over the locations (as a hider), and maintaining his mixed action as a seeker.
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3.3 Completing the proof
Any mixed strategy x of player 1 in the bimatrix game induces a mixed strategy of all the vertices
in ∪iSi in the obvious way. Vertex s ∈ Si plays the action 1 with probability p where p is the
conditional probability
Prx(~αSi(s) = 1|Player 1 controls Si).
If the event “Player 1 controls Si” occurs with probability 0, then we define (arbitrarily) that p = 1.
Similarly, any mixed strategy y of player 2 induces a mixed strategy of all the vertices in ∪iTi.
We claim that if (x, y) is an ε′-approximate Nash equilibrium of the bimatrix game, then the
induced mixed-strategies profile is an (ε, δ)-approximate Nash equilibrium of the original graphical
game.
By Lemma 2 and Markov’s inequality, for a
(
1−O
(√
λ
))
-fraction of the subsets, the row
player distributes within a
(
1±O
(√
λ
))
-factor of the correct weight (k/n); i.e. x (Si) ∈ kn ·[
1−O
(√
λ
)
, 1 +O
(√
λ
)]
. Let us restrict our attention only to those subsets, and call them
good. We say that a vertex is good if it and all of its neighbors belong to good subsets. Since the
game graph is of bounded degree, we again have that a
(
1−O
(√
λ
))
-fraction of the vertices is
good.
Consider any good vertex whose induced mixed strategy is not ε-optimal in the original game
given that the rest of the vertices also play according to their induced strategies. Then, changing
its strategy in the bimatrix game (while leaving all other marginals the same), would increase the
payoff of its player by at least
(
1−O
(√
λ
))2 ·(k
n
)2
·
(
1−O
(√
λ
))
· ε · λ
18
= Ω (ελ/n) ,
where the
(
1−O
(√
λ
))2 ·( kn)2 term corresponds to the probabilities that the subsets correspond-
ing to both the vertex and any of its neighbors are played; the
(
1−O
(√
λ
))
· ε term corresponds
to the improvement of the vertex in the bimatrix game, where instead of summing the payoff
in all three edges (as in the graphical game) these three edges have weights {1 + γj}j=1,2,3 for
|γj | = O(
√
λ); finally λ/18 is the normalization. The right side follows by plugging in k =
√
n.
If (by a contradiction) a δ-fraction of the vertices have ε-improvement strategies; then one
of the players has
(
δ/2 −O
(√
λ
))
· n good vertices with an ε-improvement1. This player can
benefit Ω (ε · λ/n) from a deviation of each vertex. So his total improvement from all deviations
simultaneously is Ω (ε · δ · λ) - which is impossible when (x, y) is an ε′-approximate Nash equilibrium
for ε′ = Θ(ε · δ · λ).
4 Implications for Relative ε-approximate Nash
Daskalakis [14] defines a notion of relative (sometimes also called multiplicative [20], as opposed to
the more standard additive) ε-Nash equilibrium, and proves that in two-player games with payoffs
in [−1, 1], finding a relative ε-well supported Nash equilibrium is PPAD-complete. In particular, he
1Here we use our choice of λ = Θ(δ2), which guarantees that δ/2−O
(√
λ
)
= Ω(δ)
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concludes that the quasi-polynomial algorithm of Lipton et al. [23] cannot achieve this notion of
approximate equilibrium.
This result has two caveats: (1) Through the use of positive and negative payoffs, the gain
from deviation is large compared to the expected payoff, only because the latter is small due to
cancellation of positive and negative payoffs. Namely, the gain from deviation may be very small
compared to the expected magnitude of the payoff. (2) It only applies to the more restrictive
notion (thus rendering the hardness result weaker) of well-supported approximate equilibrium; i.e.
an equilibrium where every action in the support has to be approximately optimal. Showing PPAD-
hardness for both positive payoffs and general (non well-supported) approximate equilibrium were
left as open questions in [14]. Recently, the first question was settled in [26] where it was shown that
finding a relative ε-well-supported Nash equilibrium with positive payoffs is indeed PPAD-complete.
Here, assuming Conjecture 2, we settle the second question: we show that finding any relative
ε-approximate Nash equilibrium is PPAD-complete. Furthermore, in our hard instance the row
player has only positive payoffs and the column player has only negative payoffs, and so there is no
cancellation of payoffs as in the construction of [14].
Theorem 3. Assuming Conjecture 2 there exists a constant ε′ = Θ
(
ε · δ3) > 0 such that finding a
relative ε′-approximate Nash equilibrium (ANE) in a bimatrix game where the row player’s payoffs
are non-negative and the column player’s payoffs are non-positive is PPAD-complete.
Proving a similar theorem when both players have positive payoffs remains an interesting open
question. In fact, we do not know of any instances with positive payoffs where all ε-approximate
Nash equilibria must have large (e.g., linear, or even super-logarithmic) support.
Proof. We reduce from the problem of finding an (additive) (ε, δ)-Nash in a bipartite, degree 3,
polymatrix game with two actions per player. We construct a main game where the bimatrix game
players (henceforth just players) control the nodes of the polymatrix game, and two side games
that guarantee that each player randomizes (approximately) uniformly over all her nodes.
Main game We let the row player “control” the nodes on one side of the bipartite game graph,
and let the column player control the nodes on the other side. Namely, let n be the number
of nodes on each side of the graph; each player has 2n actions, each corresponding to a choice
of node and an action for that node. When the players play strategies that correspond to
adjacent nodes in the graphs, they receive the payoffs of the corresponding nodes, scaled (by
a small positive constant η = O
(
δ2
)
) and shifted to fit in the intervals: [1, 1 + η] for the row
player, and [− (1 + η) ,−1] for the column player. If the nodes played do not share an edge
in the bipartite game graph, the utility for both players is zero. Notice that if either player
chooses her node uniformly at random (and chooses the action for that node arbitrarily),
then the expected payoff is in 3n · [1, 1 + η] for the row player, and in 3n · [− (1 + η) ,−1] for
the column player.
Side games We also let the players play two hide-and-seek win-lose zero-sum games over a space
of n actions. In both games, the row player is chasing the column player. In each game, if
they pick the same strategy, the row player receives payoff 1 (and the column player receives
−1); otherwise the payoffs are 0. Finally, in the first side game we identify the row player’s
strategies with her choice of nodes in the main game. Namely, if she plays node i in the main
game and the column player chose i in the first side game, then her payoff from this side
game is 1. Similarly, we identify the column player’s strategies in the second game with her
choice of nodes in the main game.
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We proceed by showing that in every relative ε′-ANE, the row player’s utility is approximately
5/n, and the column player’s utility is approximately −5/n (Lemma 4); then we show that in
every relative ε′-ANE, both players randomize approximately uniformly over their nodes (Lemma
5); finally we use these two observations to complete the proof (Subsection 4.2).
4.1 Value and structure of a relative ε′-ANE
Given mixed strategies (x, y), we let x (i) denote the total probability that the row player assigns
to node i, and analogously for y (j). We also let x∗ (y) and y∗ (x) denote the corresponding best
responses of each player. Finally, let UR (x; y) and UC (y;x) denote the expected payoffs for the
row and column players, respectively.
Lemma 4. If (x, y) is a relative ε′-ANE, then
(
1− ε′) · 5
n
≤ UR (x; y) ≤ (1 + η)
(
1 + ε′
) · 5 + 3η
n
(1)
and
− (1− ε′) (1− η) · 5
n
≥ UC (y;x) ≥ −
(
1 + ε′
) · 5 + 3η
n
(2)
Proof. Observe that the main game is relative η-approximately zero-sum; i.e. for any pure strategy
profile (x′, y′) the expected utilities UmainR (x
′; y′) , UmainC (y
′;x′) of the row and column player,
respectively, satisfy:∣∣∣UmainR (x′; y′)+ UmainC (y′;x′)∣∣∣ ≤ η ·min{UmainR (x′; y′) ,−UmainC (y′;x′)} (3)
By linearity of expectation and convexity of the absolute value function, this continues to hold
when (x′, y′) are mixed strategies. Furthermore, since the side games are exactly zero-sum and
have the same signs as the main game, the same follows for the payoffs from the entire game:
∣∣UR (x′; y′)+ UC (y′;x′)∣∣ ≤ η ·min{UR (x′; y′) ,−UC (y′;x′)} (4)
In particular, the above inequality holds for (x, y). Thus, the upper bounds in (1) and (2) follow
from the lower bounds in (2) and (1), respectively.
Finally, (1− ε′)· 5n ≤ UR (x; y) in every relative ε′-ANE, because the row player can guarantee an
expected payoff of at least 5n by randomizing uniformly over all her strategies. Similarly, UC (y;x) ≥
− (1 + ε′)
(
3(1+η)+2
n
)
because the column player can guarantee a payoff of at least −3(1+η)+2n by
randomizing uniformly over all her strategies.
Lemma 5. There exists a constant λ = Θ
(
δ2
)
such that for every (x, y) relative ε′-ANE,
∑∣∣x (i)− 1n ∣∣ ≤
λ and
∑∣∣y (j)− 1n ∣∣ ≤ λ.
Proof. Assume by contradiction that
∑∣∣x (i)− 1n ∣∣ > λ, then in particular there must exist an
i ∈ [n] such that x (i) < (1− λ/2) /n. When the column player chooses her strategy uniformly at
random in the main game and in the second side game and plays strategy i in the first side game,
her expected payoff is at least
UC (y
∗ (x) ;x) ≥ − 3
n
(1 + η)− 1
n
− x (i) .
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Therefore, in any relative ε′-ANE her expected utility is at least
UC (y;x) ≥
(
1 + ε′
) · (−5− 3η + λ/2
n
)
,
Which contradicts the upper bound in (2) when we take λ sufficiently large, e.g. λ = 10η.
Similarly, if
∑∣∣y (j)− 1n ∣∣ > λ, there must exist an j ∈ [n] such that y (j) > (1 + λ/2) /n.
Therefore, the row player can guarantee a payoff of at least
UR (x
∗ (y) ; y) ≥ 4
n
+ y (j) .
Thus by relative ε′-ANE,
UR (x; y) ≥
(
1− ε′) · (5 + λ/2
n
)
,
which contradicts the upper bound in (1).
4.2 Completing the proof of Theorem 3
Now, given a relative ε′-ANE (x, y), we can take, for each node i, the mixed strategy induced by the
probabilities x (i : 1) /x (i) and x (i : 2) /x (i) that the row player assigns to each action (respectively,
y (j : 1) /y (j) and y (j : 2) /y (j) assigned by the column player). We claim that this strategy profile
is an (ε, δ)-approximate equilibrium for the polymatrix game. Assume by contradiction that this
is not the case.
By Lemma 5 and Markov’s inequality, a
(
1−O
(√
λ
))
-fraction of the nodes are played within
√
λ
n of the correct probability 1/n. For a node i controlled by the row player, we say that it is good if
|x (i)− 1/n| ≤
√
λ
n and |y (j)− 1/n| ≤
√
λ
n ∀j ∈ N (i), and analogously for column player’s nodes.
Since the graph has bounded degree, a
(
1−O
(√
λ
))
-fraction of the nodes are good.
Let i be any good node who has an ε-improving deviation from her induced strategy in the
polymatrix game. If the player who controls i makes the corresponding deviation in the two-player
game, she increases her expected payoff by at least ε · η · 1
n2
·
(
1−O
(√
λ
))
. (We multiply by η to
account for the scaling; by 1/n2 for the probability that this player plays node i and the other player
plays a neighbor of i; and by
(
1−O
(√
λ
))
to correct for the deviation from 1/n in the latter
probabilities.) By our assumption that the induced strategy profile is not an (ε, δ)-approximate
equilibrium for the polymatrix game, at least one of the players has at least
(
δ −O
(√
λ
))
n good
nodes with ε-improving deviations. Summing her gains from those deviations, we get that this
player has can improve her expected payoff by at least
[
ε · η ·
(
1−O
(√
λ
))](
δ −O
(√
λ
))
/n.
However, this is a contradiction since it follows from Lemma 4, that (x, y) is also an (additive)
ε′ · ( 6n)-ANE.
5 Implications for Fairness Mechanisms
Competitive equilibrium from equal incomes (CEEI) is a well-known fair allocation mechanism
[18, 29, 27]: We give all agents a unit of money, and price the goods in such a way that the
market clears. It is also well-known that when goods are indivisible or utilities are non-linear, an
equilibrium may not exist. However, Budish [10] proves that an approximate CEEI still exists.
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This concept of approximate equilibrium is used in practical system for allocating seats in courses
to business school students [11].
Budish [10] measures the proximity to a perfect CEEI via two parameters: a solution is an
(α, β)-CEEI if the clearing error of the competitive equilibrium is less than α, and all the incomes
are between 1 and 1+β. Budish shows that an (α, β) always exists for some favorable α = α∗, and
any β > 0. Recently, [25] showed a reduction from ε-Gcircuit with fan-out 2, to the problem of
finding an (α∗,Θ(ε/ log (1/ε)))-CEEI. In particular, when combined with the results of [26], this
implies that it is PPAD-complete to find an (α∗, β)-CEEI for some constant β > 0.
The β parameter used in Budish’s formulation is an imperfect way of measuring income in-
equalities, as it may be set by a single outlier. Perhaps the best known, and most widely used,
measure of income inequality is the Gini index (e.g. [19, 13]) (see the Appendix for the definition).
In fact, the Gini index is used to assess the performance of the class seat assignment system used
in practice [11].
Theorem 4 (Informal). Assuming Conjecture 2, finding an income assignment and prices with
low market clearing error and near-optimal Gini index is PPAD-complete.
See the appendix for the precise definitions and statement of the result.
6 Discussion
The purpose of this paper is to showcase an important open problem:
reduce End of the Line to (ε, δ)-Gcircuit
— i.e., show that Conjecture 1 implies Conjecture 2. As we mentioned, such a reduction would
imply a “PCP for PPAD”; i.e. it would imply that there exists a probabilistically checkable proof
for a PPAD-complete problem.
The equivalent statement for the class of NP-complete problem, is the celebrated PCP Theorem
[4, 3]. What can we learn from our experience with constructing PCP’s for NP? First of all, we
have many different constructions of PCPs for NP, and this may be seen as circumstantial evidence
that constructing a PCP for PPAD is possible. Equally important, there are several constructions
of PCPs for NP that are near-linear (e.g. [6, 7, 17, 24]); notice that for the application to ε-Nash
in bimatrix games we need the proof length to be sub-quadratic.
The next question one should ask is, whether we can adapt the techniques used in the proofs
of the PCP Theorem to the class of PPAD-complete problems. We briefly and informally sketch
some of our thoughts on the matter. All the proofs of the PCP Theorems that we are aware of
(including [4, 3, 17]) compose an inner verifier with an outer verifier. The outer verifier in Dinur’s
proof [17] is combinatorial in nature, and it seems plausible that the same or similar techniques
could be modified to fit the generalized circuit graph. Unfortunately, all inner verifiers that we
know are discrete in nature, whereas our characterization of PPAD with Gcircuit (or Nash) is
inherently based on continuous constraints. Thus the following interesting (and somewhat open-
ended) questions arise: Can we find a characterization of PPAD via a constraint satisfaction problem
whose constraints are discrete in nature? Alternatively, can one construct an inner (non-efficient)
verifier using the constraints specified in the definition of the Gcircuit problem?
Acknowledgments: Many thanks to Boaz Barak, Paul Cristiano, Muli Safra, and Madhu Sudan
for inspiring discussions about probabilistic checkable proofs.
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A Finding a good partition
Lemma 6. Let G = (U, V,E) be a bipartite d-regular graph with n = |U | = |V |. Then we can
efficiently find partitions S1, . . . , Sn/k and T1, . . . , Tn/k of U and V , respectively, to disjoint subsets,
such that each subset has size at most 2k = 2
√
n, and:
∀i, j ∈ [n/k] |(Si × Tj) ∩ E| < 2d2k2/n.
Proof. Let S1, . . . , Sn/k be an arbitrary partition of U into disjoint subsets of size exactly k. We
inductively place the vertices of V into subsets T1, . . . , Tn/k, while maintaining the desiderata that
each subset Tj is of size at most 2k, and for every i, j the number of edges from Si to Tj is at most
2d2k2/n.
It is left to show that for any partial partition of V , there is a subset TJ into which we can
place the next vertex v. In expectation, every subset Tj has less than k vertices. Therefore by
Markov’s inequality, less than half of the subsets have 2k vertices or more. v has neighbors in at
most d subsets Si. Recall that the Si’s are of size exactly k. Thus each Si with a neighbor of v
has, in expectation over j, less than dk2/n neighbors in Tj. Using Markov’s inequality again, less
than a 1/(2d)-fraction of the subsets Tj contain 2d
2k2/n neighbors of Si. In total, we lose less than
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half the subsets for the size desideratum, and less than 1/(2d)-fraction of the subsets for each Si
containing a neighbor of v. Therefore there always remains at least one subset Tj to which we can
add v.
B The course allocation problem
Even though the approximate CEEI and the existence theorem in [10] are applicable to a broad
range of allocation problems, we shall describe our results in the language of the course allocation
problem.
We are given a set of M courses with integer capacities (the supply) (qj)
M
j=1, and a set of N
students, where each student i has a set Ψi ⊆ 2M of permissible course bundles, with each bundle
containing at most k ≤ M courses. The set Ψi encodes both scheduling constraints (e.g., courses
that meet at the same time) and any constraints specific to student i (e.g. prerequisites).
Each student i has a strict ordering over her permissible schedules, denoted by 4i. We allow
arbitrarily complex preferences — in particular, students may regard courses as substitutes or
complements. More formally:
Definition 5. Course Allocation Problem The input to a course allocation problem consists
of:
• For each student i a set of course bundles (Ψi)Ni=1.
• The students’ reported preferences, (4i)Ni=1,
• The course capacities, (qj)Mj=1, and
The output to a course allocation problem consists of:
• Prices for each course (p∗j )Mj=1,
• Allocations for each student(x∗i )Ni=1, and
• Budgets for each student (b∗i )Ni=1.
The quality of an allocation is evaluated based on its proximity to market clearing and income
equality. As for the definition of market clearing error, it suffices for our purposes to require that
no course is over-subscribed or under-subscribed by more than α∗ students (we refer the curious
reader to [10] for the precise definition). The Gini coefficient, which measures income inequality, is
discussed in the following subsection.
B.1 The Gini coefficient
Definition 6 (Gini index). Given a distribution of incomes D, the Lorenz curve plots, for each
x ∈ [0, 1], the cumulative wealth owned by the bottom x-fraction of the population. Let F−1D (x) =
sup
{
y : Prz∼D[z ≤ y] ≤ x
}
, and define LD(x) =
(∫ x
0 F
−1
D (x)
)
/
(∫ 1
0 F
−1
D (x)
)
. Then the Lorenz
curve is the graph
(
x,LD(x)
)
, for x ∈ [0, 1]. Notice that F−1D (x) is monotonically non-decreasing,
so the Lorenz curve is convex.
The Gini index is defined as the ratio of the area between the
(
x, x
)
line and the Lorenz curve
(by the convexity, x ≥ LD(x)∀x ∈ [0, 1]), divided by the entire area under the
(
x, x
)
line (the latter
is always 1/2): GD = 2
∫ 1
0 (x− LD(x))dx = 1− 2
∫ 1
0 LD(x)dx
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In general, a smaller Gini index corresponds to a more equal distribution of wealth. For example,
when all incomes are exactly equal, the Lorenz curve is exactly equal to the
(
x, x
)
line, and the
Gini index is 0. On the other extreme, when one person has all the wealth, the area under the
Lorenz curve goes to 0 as the population size increases, and the Gini index approaches 1.
B.2 Intractability of approximate CEEI with near-optimal Gini index
Theorem (Theorem 4, formal). Assuming Conjecture 2, there exists some constant γ > 0 such
that finding an allocation with market clearing error α∗ and Gini coefficient γ is PPAD-complete.
The rest of this section is devoted to sketching a proof of Theorem 4. In the next subsection, we
briefly outline the reduction of [25] from generalized circuits with fan-out 2 to approximate CEEI.
(Recall that in Section 2 we show how to convert any generalized circuit to one with fan-out 2.)
Then, we show that after normalizing the median budget to 1 + ε′/2, in any allocation which does
not correspond to a valid solution to the (ε, δ)-Gcircuit instance, a δ′-fraction of the students
have budgets either at most 1 or at least 1 + ε′, (for some constants ε′ = Θ(ε/ log(1/ε)) and
δ′ = Θ(δ/ log(1/ε))). Then, the proof is complete with the following lemma:
Lemma 7. Let the median income be 1 + ε′/2, and suppose that a δ′-fraction of the population
has income at most 1 (resp. at least 1 + ε′). Then the Gini index is at least γ = Θ(δ′ · ε′) =
Θ(δ · ε/ log2(1/ε)).
Proof. The total income of the poorer half of the population is at most (1/2− δ′)(1 + ε′/2) + δ′ =
(1/2)(1 + ε′/2) − δ′ · ε′/2, whereas the richer half of the population has a total income of at least
(1/2)(1 + ε′/2). Therefore, the Lorenz curve’s value at 1/2 is bounded by
L(1/2) ≤ (1/2)(1 + ε
′/2) − δ′ · ε′/2
(1 + ε′/2)− δ′ · ε′/2 = 1/2 −Θ(δ
′ · ε′).
We can now use elementary geometry to bound the area under the Lorenz curve:∫ 1
0
L(x)dx =
∫ 1/2
0
L(x)dx+
∫ 1
1/2
L(x)dx
≤ 1
4
[
0 +
(
1/2−Θ(δ′ · ε′))]+ 1
4
[(
1/2−Θ(δ′ · ε′))+ 1]
= 1/2 −Θ(δ′ · ε′).
Therefore the Gini index is at least Θ(δ′ · ε′). A similar argument works when a δ′-fraction of the
population has income at least 1 + ε′.
B.3 From generalized circuits to Course Allocation
[25] reduce generalized circuits to Course Allocation, by constructing a gadget for each gate of the
generalized circuit. (In fact, a few gadgets per gate are required to handle a subtle issue that [25]
call ”course-size amplification”.) We provide the gadget for the NOT gate as an example, and then
describe the properties of the [25]’s reduction that we need to complete the proof.
We henceforth normalize the prices and budgets in every assignment to the Course Allocation
instance such that the median budget is 1 + ε′/2.
Lemma 8 (Essentially [25]). Let nx > 6α
∗ and suppose that the economy contains the following
courses:
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• cx (the “input course”) ;
• c1−x with capacity q1−x = 2nx/3 (the “output course”);
and the following set of students:
• nx students interested only in the schedule {cx, c1−x};
and suppose further that at most n1−x = nx/6 other students are interested in course c1−x.
Then in any normalized approximate CEEI with market clearing error at most α∗, at least one
of the following must hold:
The gate is ε′-satisfied
p∗1−x ∈
[
1− p∗x, 1 − p∗x + ε′
]
The gadget contributes to income inequality A constant fraction of the nx students have
budgets either less than 1 or greater than 1 + ε′.
Proof. Observe that:
• If p∗1−x > 1− p∗x + ε′, then none of the nx students can afford the bundle {cx, c1−x} - except
those whose budget is greater than 1 + ε′. Other than them, there are at most n1−x = nx/6
students enrolled in the c1−x - much less than the capacity 2nx/3. Therefore for the market
clearing error to be less than α∗ = nx/6, nx/3 of the students must have budget greater than
1 + ε′
• On the other hand, if p∗1−x < 1 − p∗x, then all nx students can afford the bundle {cx, c1−x} -
except for those whose budget is less than 1. Therefore in order to satisfy the market clearing
requirement, at least nx/6 students must have budget less than 1.
Similarly, [25] provide gadgets for all the gates in the definition of the Gcircuit problem, and
show that they can be concatenated to simulate the computation on the generalized circuit. For
each gate of the generalized circuit, [25]’s reduction uses at most Θ(1/ log(1/ε)) (in particular, a
constant) number of gadgets. Furthermore, the number of students that participate in each of
those gadgets is approximately the same (Θ(α∗)). Therefore, for every gate which is not ε-satisfied,
there are at least Θ(α∗) students whose budgets are either at most 1 or at least 1 + ε′. Thus if the
assignment to the Course Allocation problem does not correspond to an (ε, δ)-approximate solution
to Gcircuit, then a δ′ = Θ(δ/ log(1/ε))-fraction of the students must have budgets at most 1 or
at least 1 + ε′. Applying Lemma 7 completes the proof of Theorem 4.
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